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1 Introduction
The ECB’s monetary policy strategy hinges on a numerical definition of price
stability and a two-pillar method of analysing risks to price stability. Price stability
is defined by the ECB Governing Council as a growth rate in the Harmonised Index
of Consumer Prices (HICP) of close to, but below, 2 %. This is to be upheld over
the medium-term. The two-pillar strategy refers to economic (Pillar 1) and monetary
(Pillar 2) analysis that informs policy rate decisions made by the Governing
Council.1 Pillar 1 takes into account the main factors that affect price developments
in both the short- and medium-term and its main emphasis is on real economic
activity. Pillar 2 is mainly concerned with the long-run relationship between money
and prices and, therefore, undertakes comprehensive analysis of monetary and credit
developments in the Area. Since its relegation to pillar 2, the main emphasis of the
monetary analysis has been on the fundamentals of the monetary aggregates, such as
the role of cross-border portfolio flows.
Many economic commentators have argued that central banks are partly to be
blamed for the financial crisis, with allegations that short-term price stability was
favoured at the expense of excessive debt growth. For example, in the Euro Area,
despite the ECB’s Pillar 2 strategy, it has been argued that too little was done to
curb credit growth prior to the crisis, and that the ECB as an institution focused too
much on price stability. This alleged institutional bias was seemingly evident when
the ECB raised its policy rate in the face of global financial panic in July 2008 and
in 2011 in the face of the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis. However, the decisions
had to be reversed in both cases.
In contributing to the debate on the ECB’s behaviour in setting the policy rate,
this paper focuses on analysis that provides quantitative insights into the
aforementioned qualitative argument proposed by commentators by investigating
the ECB’s monetary policy reaction function during the periods before and after the
crisis. However, it is worthwhile to distinguish between monetary policy reaction
function and monetary policy strategy. A central bank’s monetary policy strategy
refers to analysis and criteria determining how monetary policy decisions are made
to achieve the underlying stated objective(s). A monetary policy reaction function,
on the other hand, outlines the response of the central bank’s policy decisions
(short-term interest rate changes) to changes in economic variables such as the
output gap and inflation. The monetary policy reaction function can thus be thought
of as a way of modelling a central bank’s monetary policy strategy. Therefore, the
focus of this paper is on the ECB’s reaction function vis-a-vis its two-pillar
monetary policy strategy.
Arguably, the most well-known reaction function is the Taylor rule, introduced
by Taylor (1993). However, a similar reaction function was also proposed by
Henderson and McKibbin (1993). Taylor’s (1993) rule was, specifically, for the US
economy, which matches the Fed’s dual mandate for optimising both price stability
1 The initial strategy adopted by the Governing Council in 1998 regarded monetary analysis as Pillar 1
and the economic analysis as Pillar 2. However, monetary aggregate was downgraded to Pillar 2 from
2003.
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and employment. Numerous variations of the reaction functions have been adopted
that seek to provide a better fit based on economic theory, empirical works or based
on different central banks’ mandates. Taylor (1999) discusses some earlier
alternative rules, while Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy and Papell (2011) provide an updated
discussion.
From a European perspective, Peersman and Smets (1999) demonstrate that a
Taylor style rule provides a good fit of an aggregated Euro Area model using data
from the period 1979–1997. Other papers have sought to address the differences
between the ECB policy and that of the European central banks before the
introduction of the Euro, e.g. the Bundesbank. For instance, Faust et al. (2001)
concluded that the ECB placed more emphasis on the output gap and less on
inflation than the Bundesbank. Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003) extended this work
by incorporating different output gap definitions and a measure of monetary growth.
They found that monetary growth is significant in an ECB reaction function and has
the effect of reducing the coefficients of the output gap and inflation. Gerdesmeier
and Roffia (2003) interpret this as the monetary variable contains additional insight
that not fully reflected in forecasts, which is in line with the ECB’s cross-checking
strategy. Carstensen (2006) identifies various works, which analyse the ECB’s
behaviour and draw a significant conclusion that, unlike the Taylor-rule analysis of
other countries, inflation is often found to be of little or no statistical significance.2
Instead, the output gap variable is found to have a strong positive coefficient and
statistical significance. In a same vein, Belke and Polleit (2007), who analysed the
policy setting behaviours of the ECB and the US Fed, also came to the same
conclusion that the ECB placed lighter weight on inflation than output compared to
the Fed. Gerlach (2007) suggests that this is because the ECB viewed inflation over
the period as of temporary nature, believing that the current output gap is a more
important determinant of actual future inflation. However, this explanation might
not be entirely satisfactory as the evidence on this is unclear. An alternative
explanation was provided by Belke and Polleit (2007), who argue that the lighter
weight placed on inflation by the bank might be due to the fact that inflation during
the period was very low. This seems to be more plausible as the period prior to the
financial crisis was known as the great moderation period due to the low inflation
and output volatility recorded.
Gerlach (2007) finds an important distinction between the ECB’s reaction
function and those of other central banks, in that subjective measure of output such
as the European Commission’s Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) and the ECB’s
own GDP forecasts have a higher statistical significance than statistically
estimations of output gap. Gerlach (2007) also concurs with the findings of
Heinemann and Ulrich (2005) that, in addition to other variables, the ECB also
responds to the growth of the area’s nominal effective exchange rate (NEER).
Reaction functions have also been applied to analyse the ECB’s response to the
recent crisis. Gorter et al. (2009) compare reaction functions prior to the crisis with
functions incorporating a full sample and report that the coefficient on inflation
increases in the crisis years. Gerlach and Lewis (2010) look at the issue of setting
2 These authors include Artus and Wyplosz (2002), Faust et al. (2001), Gali (2001) and Neumann (2001)
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policy rates in the face of the zero-lower-bound (ZLB). They conclude that rates
were cut quicker in 2008 and 2009 than suggested by a pre-crisis reaction function.
Furthermore, they note that the overnight rate, EONIA, which historically is
correlated with the policy rate, was pushed much lower due to the unconventional
monetary measures, such as liquidity support implemented by the bank. They
conclude that this an evidence that the ECB was acting according to the literature
relating to the monetary policy in the face of the ZLB.3 Gerlach (2003) and
Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) introduce the idea of ‘recession aversion’,
suggesting an asymmetric reaction function in which deviations below potential
output are treated more seriously than deviations above.
The empirical analysis undertaken by this paper is concerned with a typical
reaction function of the ECB and contributes to the existing literature in two ways.
First, in addition to obtaining estimates for the full sample period, the sample is split
into pre- and crisis periods using a structural break test. Estimates for the two sub-
sample periods are carried out and compared with the whole period’s results. This
enables us to separate the analysis into whether the ECB’s interest setting behaviour
changed during the crisis or not, and which factors were more important in
influencing the bank’s monetary policy strategy in each. Second, and in contrast to
previous studies, the analysis includes both positive and negative rate changes as its
dependent variable. This allows for a cross check on previous findings that suggest
the ECB’s rate setting policy behaviour may be asymmetric, such as only
considering the inflation variable during a tightening cycle. Similarly, by separating
the dependant variable and the time periods, analysis can be made regarding the
extent to which this asymmetry may also have changed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses ‘‘new theory’’
on international monetary policy inter-dependence as a results of the financial crisis.
Section 3 provides a detailed account of the model choice, specifications and the
data used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the econometric estimates while Sect. 5
concludes.
2 ‘‘New theory’’: international monetary policy inter-dependence
Rule-based monetary policy has been adopted by central banks since the late 1980s
with particular emphasis on price stability. The Taylor rule, which was introduced
above, is the most common reaction function that has typified monetary policy
setting behaviour of the banks. Such rules address issues of time inconsistency and
promote transparency in monetary policy decisions. Consequently, monetary policy
environment was largely determined by domestic macroeconomic outlook with very
little consideration to foreign economic developments (Belke et al. 2014).
According to Taylor (2013), this was not a problem during the ‘‘great moderation’’
period, from the late 1980s to the mid-2000s, as the international environment was
in equilibrium. He, however, contends that this seemingly balanced situation was
3 See Reifschneider and Williams (2000) for a detailed discussion on optimal monetary policy in the
presence of the ZLB.
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perturbed by deviations from the Taylor rule in the US and, subsequently, other
countries, where interest rates were held lower than implied by the rule. These
deviations were partly blamed for the development of asset price booms and busts,
in the US, which led to the Great Recession with very serious consequences for the
rest of the world (Taylor 2009). Specifically, the low policy rate in the US led to,
among other things, two main developments. First, a depreciation of the dollar,
which other countries resisted by also cutting their interest rates in return. Second, it
led to the development of greater appetite for riskier activities as businesses sought
out investments that yield higher returns. As a result of the crisis, the international
financial system was greatly disturbed, and the ability of the central banks to set
monetary policy independent of foreign developments was curtailed. Therefore,
empirical work that deals with monetary policy during this period needs to address
this issue of international interdependence. Belke et al. (2014) have shown that
accommodating these ‘‘international spill overs’’ not only has a theoretical
justification, but also improves the performance of an estimated Taylor reaction
faction for this period as evidenced in the results they reported for the ECB, the
Bank of England, The Fed and the Bank of Japan. This paper addresses the issue in
Sect. 3.
3 The empirical methodology
3.1 The ordered probit model
Policy rate changes at the ECB are discrete actions taken by the Governing Council
based on a combination of different analysis. The Council’s interpretation of this
analysis is subjective and, normally, must justify a rate rise of at least 25 bps. The
policy rate is thus often left unchanged for long periods, and this leads to the policy
rate series highly autocorrelated, with last period’s interest rate being the best guess
of this period’s. To overcome this problem, part of the literature substitutes the
policy rate with the overnight interest rate, EONIA, which is the main transmission
mechanism for the ECB’s policy rate to market rates. However, there are two
reasons why using EONIA in its raw form as a dependant variable in this paper
might not be suitable. First, this analysis is concerned only with identifying the
emphasis placed by the Council on variables when justifying a change in rates,
rather than the continuous relationship between macroeconomic variables and the
policy rate. Second, the analysis looks at which factors are used to justify rate
changes policies during both tightening and loosening cycles. Thus the chosen
model needs to allow for splitting the dependent variable into positive and negative
policy changes. As such, the ordered-probit model, which is used to model
dependant series with discrete changes, is adopted and a variable series is created to
signify rate changes. The reason for doing this is that during the crisis period the
normal relationship between the EONIA and the policy rate became uncorrelated
due to the use of the unconventional policy measures and the greater use of verbal
communications adopted by the bank. As such, we may draw incorrect conclusions
by focussing solely on the main policy rate. The construction of the alternative
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EONIA variable is explained in the data section. Nevertheless, the EONIA in its
actual form is also used in one of the specifications for robustness checks.
In the ordered-probit model, an observed variable, Y, changes each period by one
of J different discrete amounts. The impetus for the change is represented by a latent
level that does not just appear in single time period, but rather is allowed to fluctuate
continuously. Once this level, made up of changes in the explanatory variables
reaches a certain threshold value, it signifies a rate change. The impetus for rate
changes is defined as the difference between the continuous latent level and a lagged
value of the observed policy rate, Yt  Yt1. The latent level is defined in terms of
its own changes from period to period, plus some initial level, Y0 . A vector of
lagged explanatory variables, DX plus a disturbance, et, cause changes in the latent
level. The model can thus be expressed as:
DYt ¼ DX
0
t1bþ et ð1Þ
where Yt represents the policy rate, X
0
t is a vector of explanatory variables and et is
an error term. The impetus is denoted by Zt and can be written as the sum of the new
pressure for a change and the pressure carried over from the last period and can be
represented as:
Zt ¼ DYt þ Yt1  Yt1
  ð2Þ
Therefore, changes in the policy rate depend on the value of Zt, with direction and
scale of changes determined by the set of threshold values based on the pattern of
observed rate changes in the data.
3.2 The ECB strategy and targeted variable developments
The ECB is governed under the law according to the Maastricht Treaty. Article
105(1) of the Maastricht Treaty states that ‘‘the primary objective of the Euro
System of Central Banks shall be to maintain price stability’’. The ECB fulfils this
mandate by using a strategy that comprises of a quantitative definition of price
stability and the two-pillar approach discussed in Sect. 1 of the paper. The two
pillars allow the ECB Governing Council to cross-check the views it infers from
both economic and monetary analysis. In a speech in 2005, the former Chief
Economist of the ECB, Otmar Issing, underlined the thinking behind this process
where he states: ‘‘it has been argued that mis-measurement of the output gap in real
time has contributed to misguided economic policy decisions’’ and that ‘‘historical
experience has shown that an analysis of money and credit developments can
provide information in advance of a build-up of asset price overvaluations.’’ As a
result of these considerations, Issing stated that the measure of broad monetary
aggregates, M3 appears to have predictive power for inflationary pressures at
horizons longer than those in other real and financial indicators.
Hence, the aim of the monetary pillar is to anticipate developments that cannot be
inferred from real economic variables alone, such as asset price bubbles.
Importantly, however, as the ECB has also communicated, it must be able to
disentangle shocks in these monetary variables from the underlying trends. For
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instance, over the 2-year period, from November 2001 to October 2003, the annual
growth rate of M3 averaged 7.7 %, far above the reference rate of 4.5 %. This
positive monetary shock could not be explained by developments in traditional
monetary determinants, such as output, prices and interest rates alone. However, the
ECB’s analysis under its monetary pillar suggest that this rise was due to portfolio
shifts stemming from a liquidity preference shock. As a result, the ECB constructed
an M3 series that accounted for such portfolio shifts, which in turn suggest that
monetary developments would not have an adverse effect on future inflation.
Taking these and other previous communications from the ECB into account is
important in understanding which variables should be included when analysing the
ECB’s reaction function. For instance, in addition to the normal M3 variable that
Issing and the ECB policy documents refer to, it can also be insightful to analyse the
M3 series adjusted for portfolio shifts series, which is referred to above. This series
was published by the ECB from January 1999 to July 2008. In addition, the analysis
also uses real-time variables, which provide an indication of the information that
was available to the ECB Governing Council when it was making policy decisions.
3.3 The ECB model, data and the empirical strategy
The historical evolution of the Euro Area policy decisions since the ECB’s inception
in 1999, along with those of the US Fed and the Bank of England (BoE), are
presented in Fig. 1. The figure indicates that the ECB’s policy rate started about
2 %pts and 1 %pt, respectively, lower than those of the BoE and the Fed. Over the
early 2000s, there is a little correlation between the three. Although each central
bank cuts rates sharply after the dot.com bust, by the middle of 2003 they are at very
Fig. 1 Policy rates in ECB, Bank of England and the Fed (%). Source: ECB, Bank of England, Federal
Reserve
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different levels. From 2009 to the end of 2013, neither the BoE or the Fed changed
its policy rate, but the ECB has adjusted its rates up and down. Table 1 shows
37 months out of 155 recorded changes in the ECB’s policy rate during the sample
period. A noticeable point is that positive policy rate changes tend to be small, not
more than 25 bps, rather than negative policy rate changes that are either 25 bps or
more (50 bps, and in one case, up to 75 bps).
Based on the foregoing, the specification of the model follows Dolado et al.
(2005) and Gerlach (2007) and takes an ordered-probit model of the ECB’s reaction
function in the following form:
iPt ¼ a1yt þ a2pt þ a3lt þ a4t ð3Þ
where iPt represents the Governing Council’s policy rate target, yt denotes a measure
of potential growth, pt is inflation, lt represents money growth and et is the nominal
effective exchange rate (NEER), while the constant is suppressed. The coefficients
ai are positive with the exception of a4, which is negative due to the nature of the
NEER variable, as discussed in the data section. Judd and Rudebusche (1998) argue
that an interest rate smoothing parameter should be included in the reaction func-
tion, which takes the form of:
it  it1 ¼ b0 it  it1
 þ b1Dit1 þ et ð4Þ
where et is a residual and once again the constant is omitted. Equation (4) states that
the change in the policy rate in the current period is set as some amount, b0, of the
difference between the current and the target rate as well as taking into account any
changes in the policy rate in the last period. The implication is that those responsible
for setting the policy rate avoid large, successive changes. Hence, 0\ b0\ 1 and
b1\ 0. Combining Eqs. (3) and (4) gives:
it  it1 ¼ d1yt þ d2pt þ d3lt þ d4t  b0it1 þ b1Dit1 þ et ð5Þ
where di = aib0 and it is the unobserved, latent variable. What is actually observed
is the discrete policy rate change which depends on the position of the latent level
relative to set of threshold values. These threshold values, si, take into account the
observed changes in the policy rate over the period, ranging from s1 to s5, repre-
senting five thresholds as follows:
Table 1 Changes in the Policy Rate: January, 1999–December, 2013. Source: The ECB
±25 bps ±50 bps ?/75- bps Total
Increase 16 2 0 18
Decrease 9 9 1 19
Total 23 11 1 37
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Dit ¼
0:75% if it  it1 s1
0:50% if s1\it  it1 s2
0:25% if s2\it  it1 s3
0 if s3\it  it1 s4
þ0:25% if s4\it  it1 s4
þ0:50% if s5\it  it1
8
>>>><
>>>>:
ð6Þ
where Dit is the latent continuous random variable that causes the adjustment while
si are the thresholds, which the latent variable should exceed in order to provoke
change in the value of it. Equations (5) and (6) give the final specification of the
model is estimated.
As shown in Table 1, the policy rate changes that took place during the sample
period are grouped into ±25, ±50 and ±75 bps. There are eighteen positive
changes and nineteen negative ones, giving a total of 37 policy changes that were
carried out. The ECB’s main monetary policy instrument is the official policy rate,
also known as the Repo rate. The Repo rate is used as a transmission mechanism to
steer short-term market rates such as the overnight rate, EONIA. A discrete variable
was constructed to represent changes in the Repo rate, which varies from -3 for a
-75 bps change to ?2 for a ?50 bps change.4 Also incorporated are a lagged
change in the policy rate variable in line with interest rate smoothing theory and the
lagged policy rate level to address issues of serial autocorrelation in the residuals. In
addition, a variable based on cumulative 25 bp changes in the EONIA was also
constructed. The reason for doing that is because the relationship between the
EONIA and the Repo rate broke down during the crisis period. This breakdown can
be seen in Fig. 2, which presents the Repo rate and EONIA for the sample period.
One of the variables used in the estimation of the Taylor rule is the output gap.
However, there are debates on how best to calculate this measure.5 As noted by
Gerlach (2007), the ECB national accounts data are generally not released until
several months after policy decisions have been made. The ECB typically refer to
available survey data, notably the Economic Sentiment Index, ESI. This measure
shows a strong correlation with output calculations of the Euro Area. Given these
factors, this paper uses two different economic activity measures. First, it uses the
ESI in the estimation as in Gerlach (2007). The ESI variable is sourced from the
European Commission.6 The indicator is an aggregate of surveys from all the Euro
Area member states based on five sectors. These are industry, services, consumer,
construction and retail trade. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between the ESI and
the real GDP growth. Second, we also incorporate an output gap measure in another
specification of the model. The measure of the output gap is taken from the OECD
database. Using the OECD’s output gap measure has two advantages over
calculating one applying some statistical methods, such as the Hodrick–Prescott
Filter as mostly done. First, its global publication ensures that it is likely to be a
4 The choice of values for the scale does not affect the estimates.
5 For a further discussion, see Billmeier (2004).
6 Accessed January 2014.
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robust measure ensuring that miscalculation does not influence our estimates.
Second, it ensures this work is easily replicable. Figure 4 presents this variable for
the sample period.
As part of our preliminary work, a few different model specifications,
incorporating various inflation variables such as core HICP and HICP forecasts
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, were analysed. However, as the results
did not differ significantly, we only publish those with the main HICP inflation
variable, which is the official ECB mandated target. The Governing Council
emphasises the M3 broad measure of the monetary base as its benchmark monetary
variable. This is included as a 3 mMA year-on-year growth rate in line with ECB
Fig. 2 ECB policy rate and EONIA (%)
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Fig. 3 The economic sentiment index and the Euro GDP. Source: European Commission and Eurostat
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communications. Figure 5 shows various measures of M3 including the M3
portfolio adjusted discussed above. The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is
incorporated as suggested by Heinemann and Ullrich (2005) who find that the
variable is statistically significant. The year-on-year per cent growth rate is taken to
avoid issues with structural changes over the time and it is defined such that a
positive growth rate represents appreciation, which should lead to less import price
pressures. Hence, the estimates should show a negative relationship between the
Fig. 4 Output gap (% of GDP). Source: OECD
Fig. 5 M3Real Time, M3 and M3—Portfolio Adjusted (%). Source: ECB, Euro area business cycle
network
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NEER growth and positive policy rate changes. The NEER variable is depicted in
Fig. 6. Each variable was incorporated with a lag to reflect the extent to which data
are available to the ECB when setting the rates. The ESI and HICP variables are
both available with a 1-month lag. Monetary growth and the output gap measures
are available with a 2-month lag, and 1-month lag is applied to the NEER variable
to avoid issues of simultaneity. Table 2 presents the various sources and the
definitions of the variables used in the paper.
As discussed in Sect. 2, domestic monetary policy has increasingly become
influenced by international economic activities as a result of international imbalances,
which Taylor (2013) attributes to deviations from the Taylor rule that began in the US
in the early-2000s and subsequently in other countries. Following Belke and Klose
(2013), who show that accounting for the international inter-dependence in central
banks reaction function is essential, we include foreign interest rates (represented by
the Fed rate and the Bank of England policy rate7) into the model.
Another issue worth noting is that monetary policy during the financial crisis
takes place near the zero-lower-bound. To circumvent this issue, Belke and Klose
(2013) use a measure of the central bank’s balance sheet, which explicitly captures
the effects of the unconventional monetary policy such as the quantitative easing. In
order to address this and as an additional robustness check, this paper uses the real
interest rate.8 Figure 7 demonstrates relationship between the nominal and the real
interest rates, which indicates that the latter was more variable than the former.
Fig. 6 The Euro nominal effective exchange rates (NEER). Source: ECB
7 The use of the Fed rate as a proxy for foreign interest rates is conventional in the literature due to the
dominant role of the US in the global economy. The Bank of England policy rate is used in another
specification as the UK is the closer geographically, and as a result more integrated economically in terms
of trade.
8 Results with the real interest rates are not significantly different from the reported one. Hence, they are
not reported in the paper, but are available on request.
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3.4 Pre- and financial crisis periods
A key part of the analysis comes from splitting the sample into pre-crisis and crisis
periods. To identify the most suitable breakpoint for the two periods, the Bai–Perron
multivariate structural break tests were used and the results are reported in Table 3.9
As shown in the table, the identified breakpoint is August 2007, with a 95 %
confidence interval of June 2006 to December 2008. This coincides with the period
that commentators commonly attribute as the start of the financial crisis,10 when
money markets in the US started showing signs of stress. This was chosen to split
the sample into the pre- and crisis periods. As such, in the remainder of this paper,
Table 2 Description of the variables
Variable Source Expected coefficient
ECB repo rate ECB n/a
EONIA ECB n/a
HICP Eurostat Positive
Core HICP Eurostat Positive
Money supply—M3 ECB Positive
Nominal effective exchange rate ECB Negative
Output gap Eurostat & author’s calculations Positive
Federal funds policy rate Federal Reserve Positive
Bank of England policy rate Bank of England Positive
Fig. 7 The real and nominal ECB policy rate (%). Source: ECB
9 The break has been modelled both in constant and trend. However, results for the latter indicate that the
variable is nether significant nor improve the overall results. Hence, the break in the trend was dropped.
10 See Taylor (2009) for full discussion.
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the period of January 1999 to August 2007 is referred to as the ‘‘pre-crisis’’, while
the period from September 2007 to December 2013 is called the ‘‘crisis’’ period.
4 Discussions of the estimated results
Table 4 reports the results obtained by estimating the model specified in Eq. (6). In
addition to the coefficient estimates, z-statistics and an indication of statistical
significance are also reported in the table. For each specification, the McFadden
pseudo-R2 is given, which provides an indication of likelihood for each specifi-
cation, with a greater value representing a higher likelihood. As this is an ordered-
probit model, the coefficients are interpreted as a change in the explanatory
variables inducing a higher probability of the dependent variable changing.
Comparing coefficients between explanatory variables is not appropriate due to the
scale differences between them; for instance, the ESI ranges from 70.1 to 118.6
while HICP ranges from -0.6 to 4.0 %.
The results in Table 4 show the results obtained for the whole time period using
the both the main Repo rate and the EONIA as a dependent variable. The first two
columns in each section report results of the models that utilise all policy rate
changes as the dependant variable with the ESI and the output gap (OG) as measures
of economic activity, respectively. The remaining 4 columns in each section
represent the results for positive and negative policy changes during the whole
period. Therefore, for each type of dependant variable—that is, all rate changes,
positive rate changes and negative rate changes—there are four specifications. Thus,
there are 12 separate specifications, represented by model (1)–(12) in the table.
The results from model (1) indicate that the coefficients for M3 and economic
activity have the expected signs and are statistically significant, but the coefficient
for inflation has the wrong sign and is not statistically significant. The coefficients in
model (2) are all significant, but again the coefficient of inflation is of incorrect sign,
and the same is true for M3. Of model (1) and model (2), the McFadden R2 suggests
that model (1) provides a better fit. This is supported by the fact that the monetary
coefficient estimate in model (2) is also, counter-intuitively, negative. Moreover, the
estimates for model (1) are consistent with the findings of other authors, in that the
ESI activity measure is found to be positive and significant, while the HICP measure
is found to be statistically insignificant. For example, Gerlarch (2007) who used data
for the period prior to the financial crisis, found this to be the case. Gali (2001) also
found no systematic relationship between interest rate and inflation in the Euro
Table 3 The Bai–Perron structural break tests
Coefficients Break date 95 % CI F(m) F(m|m-1)
b1 3.14** 2007:08 2006:06–2008:12 92.76 55.79
b2 0.47**
b1 and b2 refer to the mean before and after the break and ** signifies rejection at 5 %. Both BIC and
LWZ are significant for the identified break
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Area, and similar results were reported by Carstensen (2006) and Belke and Polleit
(2007). The estimates for models (7) and (8), utilising the EONIA-constructed
dependent variable, show that there is little difference between the results
irrespective of the dependent variables.
Given the better fit provided by the ESI specification, the remaining discussion
focuses on models that use this variable as a measure of economic activity. Columns
(3) and (5) show the results obtained when the dependant variable uses either
positive or negative rate changes only. The most noticeable difference between
these two is that inflation coefficient is only positive and statistically significant in
the positive rate rises. This suggests that inflation is an important factor in
determining raising interest rate during the period, but might not be a significant
factor in rate cutting decisions. The activity measure is significant in both cases—
although of a lower magnitude in the rate cutting model—while monetary growth is
both significant and almost of the same magnitude in each case. It is worth noting
that in each of the specifications discussed so far the exchange rate variable is found
to be insignificant, which is inconsistent with other studies such as Gerlach (2007),
Gali (2001) and Carstensen (2006). Again, the results when using the EONIA as
dependent variables, shown in columns (9) and (11), are similar.
Since it is clear that the specifications with the ESI produce better results than
those that used the output gap, the latter specifications for the pre-crisis and crisis
periods models are not reported in the paper.11 Consequently, Table 5 presents six
specifications for the pre-crisis period, and the same six specifications for the crisis
period. Considering only the pre-crisis period, model (1), with all the rate changes,
reveals that inflation is significant and positive, unlike under the whole time period
model. However, like the whole time period model, the ESI and the monetary
variables have positive and significant coefficients.12
Compared to the whole period models, when looking only at the pre-crisis period
the coefficient estimates for the positive and negative rate change specifications
differ. The main difference is that the inflation variable is significant only in the
negative rate change specification, shown in column (3) of Table 5. That contrasts
with the whole time period specifications, in which inflation was significant only in
the positive policy changes model. The monetary variable is also only significant
when considering negative policy rate changes, rather than only positive changes.
The coefficient on the monetary variable for all policy changes for pre-crisis model
(1) is significant, albeit, relatively low. Splitting the changes into positive and
negative show that the coefficient is only marginally significant (at 10 %) for
negative policy changes during the pre-crisis period (using the Repo rate) while it is
insignificant for the rest of the specifications. This might not be surprising as the
variable was not meant to take care of credit and debt developments, but to indicate
factors derived from the Quantity Equation. As was the case with the whole period
11 However, they are available on request. The results are consistent with the ones reported in Table 4.
12 All the models were re-estimated using the revised M3 variable, which accounted for portfolio shifts.
This variable only affects short time periods as it was discontinued in 2008. The affected time period is
the pre-crisis one. However, the results are not significantly different from the one that used M3. The only
difference is that the M3 coefficient became insignificant in the pre-crisis in the negative rate changes
model. The results are not reported, but available on request.
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model, there is little difference between the models that use the EONIA variable or
the Repo rate.
The remaining six models, (7)–(12), cover the crisis period that starts from
2007:08 to 2013:12. Lack of rate rises over this time period means that it is in this
model that the constructed EONIA variable becomes useful. Model (7) is the main,
all-policy rate changes specification for the crisis period. In this case, only the ESI is
significant, and is of the expected positive sign. The result is similar when EONIA is
used as a dependent variable, as shown in model (10). In the rate rise only model,
shown in column (11), the HICP coefficient is positive and significant, as is the ESI
coefficient. However, in the negative change specification only the ESI variable is
statistically significant.
Overall, the model estimates offer some interesting insights into the ECB policy
rate setting. From the whole time period model, the estimates in Table 4 suggest
that the ECB’s rate setting behaviour does not conform to, at least, one of the
requirements of its mandate, inflation targeting, due to the statistical insignificance
of inflation variable. However, this changes when modelling only the pre-crisis
period. That is, between 1999:01 and 2007:07 the HICP, the ESI and the monetary
growth variables coefficients were all positive and statistically significant. On that
basis, it could be concluded that the ECB appeared to be abiding by its operational
principles during the pre-crisis period. However, separating the policy changes into
positive and negative changes during the pre-crisis period shows that the coefficient
values and statistical significance are higher for rate cuts than rate rises. That could
suggest that the ECB was more averse to low inflation than worried about high
inflation during the period. This contrasts with the behaviour seen over the crisis,
when positive rate changes were influenced by both the HICP and the ESI. That
would seem somewhat paradoxical, given that the ECB should have had more
support for keeping rates lower than necessary during times of economic stress than
during the pre-crisis period. However, some sort of analysis on the extent to which
inflation expectations were factor over those two periods would be useful in order to
make a definite conclusion.
Splitting the analysis into pre- and crisis periods has provided some useful
insight, but as monetary policy has taken place near the zero-lower-bound since the
crisis, estimates with nominal interest rate such as the Repo or the EONIA should be
treated with caution. To check the extent to which this is a problem, the analysis in
this paper used a real interest rate variable as the dependent variable. This was
chosen as an alternative to the central banks’ balance sheet measure used by Belke
and Klose (2013). The results are reported in Table 6, which indicate that inflation is
insignificant for all the specification. This is consistent with other studies that found
inflation in the ECB reaction function was either marginally significant or
insignificant at all (see for example, Carstensen 2006; Belke and Polleit 2007).
The coefficients for the monetary aggregates are also insignificant in each model.
Although the economic activity measure is highly significant across both the pre-
and the crisis specifications, but it is of wrong sign in the crisis specification. This
helps to explain why it is not significant in the whole period model. Importantly, the
Pseudo R-squared are much lower than those using the nominal policy rates, which
suggests that neither of the three models using the real policy rate changes explains
Empirica
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the ECB’s policy rate setting behaviour well. This is likely to be the case because
the real interest rates show a great variation due to fluctuations in inflation, which is
evident in Fig. 7.
As discussed in Sect. 2, domestic monetary policy has become increasingly inter-
dependent during the crisis period. Taylor (2013) argues that during the period
running up to the financial crisis, international monetary equilibrium has been
perturbed. Supporting this, Belke et al. (2014) show that accounting for international
interdependence is necessary. To explicitly account for this, we undertake analysis
that includes foreign interest rates among the independent variables. Specifically,
we use the Fed rate and the Bank of England policy rate. The results these
specifications are reported in Table 7. These show that the foreign policy rates are
not significant for most of the specifications, and the rest of the results are not
significantly different from those in Table 5. The main exception is when we
consider only positive policy rate changes. In this case, both the Fed and the Bank of
England policy rates become statistically significant.
Part of the literature on monetary policy reaction function has used real-time
series in order to address the forward looking nature of monetary policy setting.
Although, this is somewhat captured by the ESI, this paper also uses real-time series
accessed from the Euro Area Business Cycle Network to complement the estimation
and also to act as additional robustness checks. The real time data started in full in
2002, which limits the number of specifications that can be estimated with them
Table 6 The ECB reaction function results—real interest rate
Real main refinancing operations rate dummy
Whole period Pre-crisis Crisis
HICP measure 0.02 0.53* 0.13
0.13 1.76 0.41
Activity measure 0.00 0.07*** -0.05***
0.14 2.91 -2.71
M3 0.05 0.13 0.05
1.45 1.58 0.52
NEER 0.02 0.06 0.02
0.31 0.74 0.23
Lagged policy change 0.64 -0.29 1.12
1.06 -0.35 1.16
Lagged policy level -0.13 -0.26 -0.36
-1.26 -1.39 -1.18
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.08 0.08
Restricted log likelihood -220.99 -117.41 -96.82
LR statistic 6.16 20.71 15.25
Average log likelihood -1.22 -1.06 -1.15
Prob (LR statistic) 0.4047 0.0021 0.0183
z-statistics are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote rejection at 10, 5 and 1 % levels
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using the probit model. We are, however, able to estimate models for the whole
period, pre- and crisis periods, but unable to split the changes into positive and
negative changes. The results from the estimations are not significantly different
from the ESI models reported in Table 5.13
Overall, the complete results seem to suggest that the ECB did abide by its two-
pillar monetary strategy in the pre-crisis period, given the significance and correct
theoretical sign of the HICP, the ESI and the monetary growth variables. However,
the results from the pre-crisis, rate rise only model cast doubt on this, given that
only the activity variable is significant in this model. This is particularly so when it
comes to contractionary monetary policy, given that, unlike inflation, the future path
of monetary growth is less likely to be affected by the activity variable. This gives
some support to some commentators’ argument that the bank did very little to curb
credit growth in the Euro Area during the period before the crisis. The policy
changes during the crisis period suggest that the ECB may have placed too much
emphasis on inflation as demonstrated by the large coefficient on the HICP variable
in the model utilising only positive policy rate changes as the dependent variable.
It could be conjectured that maintaining low interest rates during the pre-crisis
period could be attributed to ideological factors. For instance, Belke and Cui (2010)
portend that the incumbent governments’ ideology (whether belonging to the left or
right) has significant effect on monetary policy of OECD countries. They report that
central banks that are less independent tend to have low policy rates under the
leftwing governments. Since the ECB is an amalgamation of various national
central banks, attempts by the ECB to accommodate various governments of
different ideological lineages may be reflected in the estimated results.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigated the interest rate setting behaviour of the ECB for the period
between 1999 and 2013. The sample period was split into pre- and crisis periods by
using the Bai–Perron structural break test. The paper estimated models using all rate
changes as the dependent variable, as well as using only rate rises or rate cuts. This
was done for the whole sample period as well as for the two sub-periods. The results
for the whole period suggest that the ECB’s policy changes were not, on the whole,
influenced by inflation. This is consistent with other previous work in Carstensen
(2006) and Belke and Polleit (2007).
However, results from the pre-crisis and crisis periods, as well as results covering
models with the dependant variable split into positive and negative rate cycles, add
some extra insight. Over the whole time period, when considering only rate rises,
inflation becomes significant and of the correct theoretical sign. This is interesting,
but could point to a number of things. For instance, it could be that bouts of low
inflation were considered to be of a temporary nature and thus did not deem a rate
response, or due to the fact that inflation was generally low during the period. Belke
and Polleit (2007) have also found that the ECB had lower weight on inflation
13 The results are not reported, but available on request.
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relative to other central banks. Belke and Potrafke (2012) argue that government
ideological inclination is a factor in central banks’ monetary policy decisions as
they found this is the case in the OECD countries: central banks that are less
independent under the leftwing governments tend to run more expansionary
monetary policy. As the ECB is an amalgam of different central banks, it may try to
accommodate divergent views, which might be the reason. Secondly, it could be
that the long periods of low inflation have affected the results. For instance, after the
crisis, given that rates were already very low and thus unlikely to be lowered further,
it may seem that the ECB did not respond to low inflation.
Splitting the model into separate time periods also adds some support to the idea
that already low rates affected the results. That’s because, when considering only
rate cuts, in the pre-crisis period the model does find inflation to be statistically
significant and of the correct coefficient, but despite periods of below target inflation
in the crisis period, the crisis-model coefficients are not statistically significant.
Hence, in this case, although we have tested using real time data, a further area of
research could be to include explicit ECB forecasts in order to make the reaction
function specifications more forward-looking, or to find a way in which to account
for the rapid lowering of interest rates in response to the financial crisis.
Finally, for robustness checking, various specifications of the models were
estimated. These include specifications with different inflation variables, using of
real interest rates, foreign interest rates and real time data. However, none of these
results has significantly affected the results.
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